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Abstract:
The prolepsis in Denis Villeneuve’s Arrival emphasises the cyclical nature of the
film’s narrative and anchors human reproduction as a central theme. Pregnancy,
the pregnant body, and the physical, experiential nature of birth, commonly
heavily gendered in film, are misleading focal points in the narrative. The presence
of the unborn as a subtext in the film problematises Iris Marion Young’s (2005)
notion of pregnant embodiment as a subjective lived-body experience. The viewer
is encouraged to empathise with the complexity of birth, life, and death as part of
Louise’s lived-body experience, but is finally confronted with the uncertainty of
maternity, pregnancy and the unborn. When Barbara Duden (1992) calls the
unborn foetus a “not-yet”, she describes the process by which the foetus achieves a
legal status, and the precarious nature of ascribing life or personhood. The
prolepsis, which punctuates the main narrative, emphasises the reversibility and
irreversibility of life that does “not-yet” exist. Importantly, the constant hovering
over the threshold of life in the film complicates the timeline of reproduction. At
the end of the film’s narrative, the main character Louise Banks (Amy Adams), is
“not-yet” pregnant, is “not-yet” a parent, and has “not-yet” lost a child. The temporal
shifts in the film rely on repositioning or reorienting both Louise and the viewer
to the “not-yet” reproductive body and the “not-yet” child. By presenting events
out of chronological time and returning to the time before and after a child is born,
the film ultimately raises crucial questions about the ethics of reproduction,
the quality of life, and issues of consent.
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The film Arrival (Denis Villeneuve, 2016) complicates the notion
of pregnant embodiment by presenting a “not-yet” born child who dies
before conception, and a “not-yet” pregnant body. The film, therefore,
raises important questions about pregnant embodiment as a subjective,
gendered experience. Although reproduction appears in other Villeneuve
films (Enemy [2013]; Maelström [2000]), pregnancy is much more of
an integral theme and subtext in Arrival. The ellipsis that is created by
the narrative structure challenges the viewer’s understanding of the
lived-body experience of the main character Louise (Amy Adams) in
relation to her daughter Hannah (Julia Scarlett Dan, Abigail Pniowsky,
JadynMalone). The child’s life appears as a parallel narrative with fleeting
shots and sequences as if they are Louise’s memories of the past whilst
the relationship between mother and daughter is constructed so that
the viewer is encouraged to believe in the existence of the yet-to-be-born
child. The aliens’ concept of time is a recurrent motif, and we are
encouraged to accept the changing timelines in the narrative, but it is the
film’s narrative structure and corporeality that allows a rereading of
temporality in relation to maternity and pregnancy. Although the film
explores the ethics of language acquisition, translating the other, and the
knowability of science, I argue that pregnant embodiment is ultimately
thrown into question by the temporal re-ordering of the film’s narrative.
The film considers how Louise re-imagines time, but the language of
the film remains linear in that it offers a vision of the past, present, and
future. Gregory Currie (1992) suggests that the viewer does not have to
experience a temporal shift in accordance with the anachrony of a film’s
narrative, and that we do not need to think of filmic time as only in
the present or even tensed. As Currie explains, “presentness within
the story does not distinguish anything from anything else” (p. 350).
He proposes that a more useful way to think through fictional narrative
is by considering the temporal relations between events rather than
temporality. Karen Barad (2012) suggests that understanding time
depends on how we measure it, and she argues that we are constantly
“reworking” the past, present and future as part of “the making of
temporality” (p. 66, emphasis in original). Patricia Pisters (2012) contends
that in the light of contemporary digital imagery, we need to understand
how the future “cuts, assembles and orders” from the past and the present
and she offers her post-Deleuzian notion of the “neuro-image” (p. 139)
to articulate how the futural is visualised. The visual imagery in the
film, however, is not complex, and my discussion lends itself to
Daniel Frampton’s (2006) observation that “we remake the film via our
concepts, and the film remakes our vision” (p. 163). Frampton argues
that the viewer “see[s] filmically” as part of a combined, knowing, two-way
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encounter that results in a “unique third thought” (p. 163, emphasis in
original). This is a helpful way to understand how the film engages each
viewer to look beyond what is seen on the screen and beyond the (often
gendered) notions of linear or cyclical temporalities.
Although Louise’s future appears to be proscribed, the fact that the
aliens tamper with the present suggests that the future in the film can be
altered and this is reflected in the uncertainty around reproductive choice
at the end of the film. Although we are encouraged to understand
the aliens’ different concept of time, the film is not told from their point
of view. The film does not show time as the aliens see it – as happening
simultaneously. The conceit of the narrative – that the past is a
vision of the future – can only be understood by Louise and the viewer
retrospectively, by re-ordering the narrative chronologically. Furthermore,
Louise’s ability to see into the future relies on her ability to communicate
with the aliens which only becomes fully developed at the end of the
film. The language of the aliens, Louise is told, “is free of time [and like
their bodies] it has no forward or backward direction”. The aliens’ own
concept of time, however, is paradoxical. If they believe that the future
is already determined, then there is no need for them to appear on
Earth. When they offer the “gift” of their language, they explain that
they need help in three thousand years’ time, not in the present. The fact
that they understand time as linear and fixed as well as simultaneous
suggests that they can function within dimensions of time that appear to
be in opposition. That their language and bodies are free of time, however,
does not necessarily mean that they are suspended in time or have no
concept of the embodied thresholds between the past and the future.
It is crucial to understand that the film exudes embodiment and
encourages the viewer to be aware of how the body and the senses are
being challenged. The viewer is drawn into the film as it encouraged them
to peer into the spacecraft and at the embodied changes of the characters.
The sliding bass tone of the soundtrack fades in and out of time with the
movement of the camera as it follows the characters up into the spacecraft
on a huge industrial lift. This bass tone, accompanied by plucked strings
preceding the alien’s first appearance as finger-like creatures, appears to
overwhelm the characters and make them physically reel. The altered
state of gravity also takes the characters’ feet from under them as they
enter the spaceship where their bodies become increasingly weightless.
The changing perspective means that the viewer’s point of view is flipped
upside down as the framing shifts and the characters are seen to be
floating upwards in the frame towards the interior of the spacecraft and
then appear to be walk across the ceiling (Figure 1). This provides a visual
counterpoint to the physicality of their bodies in their space suits as they
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walk slowly and deliberately and have difficulty breathing through their
masks when on the ground. The huge size of the spaceship dwarfs the
surrounding landscape but appears weightless hanging in the sky just
above the ground. When added to the extreme darkness of the film’s
visual style and melancholic soundtrack, the film creates a mood that is
unnerving, intimate, and sombre. As the effect of physical changes on
each character is central to the film’s narrative, I suggest that, given the
central theme is reproduction, the film is marked by the apparent absence
of pregnancy and pregnant embodiment.
Pregnant embodiment
Pregnant embodiment is not crucial to the plot of the film or to
the narrative, but it anchors temporal boundaries within the film.
The threshold of life and death is continually crossed as each time
Louise “sees” Hannah, she does not exist. Pregnant embodiment, as
Iris Marion Young (2005) explains, means the pregnant subject is
“decentred, split, or doubled” (p. 46). In the context of this
film, pregnant embodiment is split and decentred, because it is both
understood to have happened and “not-yet” happened to Louise’s body.
Louise does not have a subjective experience of pregnancy in the film,
at least not one to which we are privy. Things happen to her body and
her temporal understanding, but there is no indication that she
has experienced pregnant embodiment. Any pregnancy, whether it is
understood as past, present, or future, takes place off-screen, but it is
fundamental to how the spectator understands the temporal ellipsis.
Figure 1. In a wide shot, the characters appear to be walking across the ceiling
of the spacecraft.
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The positioning of the viewer in relation to pregnancy and reproduction
does two things, it encourages them to read Louise as maternal, and
reproduction as transient and cyclical. The cyclical nature of the narrative,
however, means that the female character cannot be read as maternal
without considering the implications of the absence of maternity. Placing
pregnancy and the growth of the child in a temporal ellipsis unravels the
representation of the maternal body and pregnant embodiment.
Although pregnant embodiment is most frequently understood as
a lived-body experience that exists as a response to the presence of
the foetus, Young argues that pregnancy is commonly understood as
belonging to the foetus rather than the pregnant woman. It is pregnancy,
she argues, that is considered as “a state for the developing foetus,
for which the woman is a container” and that this is, in part, a result of
pregnancy becoming a medically “objective, observable process” (p. 46).
Importantly, the separation of bodies, she argues, silences the subjective
experience of pregnant embodiment and removes not only the individual
woman, but any pregnant woman. This challenges how we understand
pregnancy as gendered, when gendering is socially and culturally ascribed
to the individual and suggests an un-coupling of gender from pregnancy
when it is separated from the body. Young is one of many scholars
discussing pregnant embodiment and the separation of the foetus and
there has been increasing amounts of scholarship engaging with the
impact that visualising and reproductive technologies has on our
understanding of pregnancy and reproduction (Hartouni, 1997; Lam,
2016; Mitchell, 2001; Petchesky, 1987; Roberts, 2012; Sandelowski, 1994;
Taylor, 2008; van Dijck, 2005). But, it is to Barbara Duden (1992) that
I turn to begin a conversation on pregnant embodiment and the unborn.
She introduces the term “not-yet” to describe the complex historical,
cultural, social, and legal status of the foetus where it is, on the one hand,
understood as part of the woman’s body, and, on the other hand, as
separate from the pregnant body. Her discussion speaks to the way the
embodied sensations of pregnancy have been replaced by medical
verification whereby quickening, as a subjective embodied sensation
known only to the pregnant person, has been replaced by foetal status and
that this status is dependent on having, or “not-yet” having, personhood.
Because the foetus in utero is not dead and is not alive, Duden says that
the unborn “is never there with certainty. In spite of many signs and
intimations of its presence, one can never be sure about it” (1992, p. 9).
There is no assurance that it can survive outside of the body so Duden
suggests it is “a ‘not-yet’ [with] a peculiar temporal dimension” (p. 10)
whilst it remains inside the body. In the film, the spectator is encouraged
to believe in Hannah’s existence but, viewed differently, Hannah exists in
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the temporal space of the unborn: she is neither alive nor dead.
Importantly, her life is shown in moving not static images; she is not
embalmed in the photograph, nor is she shown as alive, but lifeless.
This means that the question of foetal personhood, central to any
discussion on reproductive rights, also applies to the conceptualisation
of “life”, or of “a child” as it appears in the film. The constantly moving
threshold that marks foetal viability or vitality, inextricably linked to
the history of the female reproductive body as Duden points out, is
challenged by the presence of Hannah. As she exists in the film as a
conceptualisation of a child, any embodied link to Louise remains
complicated. Crucially, the film places Hannah in Louise’s future which
means that she is not an imaginary child created in the present. There is
no evidence that Louise is preoccupied with pregnancy or with having a
child. This suggests that pregnancy in the narrative of the film is outside
of her individual understanding and something other than gendered.
Louise’s presumed pregnant embodiment, whether seen or not,
encourages the viewer to believe that the lived-body experience of
pregnancy exists in the film and that her experience as a biological
mother, as represented in the film, is an expression of her maternal
subjectivity. As the “not-yet” is crucial to the resonant denouement of the
film, I suggest that the viewer is encouraged to doubt this maternal
subjectivity and their own subjectivity in relation to the unborn and the
“not-yet” maternal. Imogen Tyler (2000) (agreeing with Battersby, 1998),
explains that pregnant embodiment is not only an actual subjective
lived-body experience, but also an embodied potential and argues that
we should be conscious of multiple subjectivities rather than just
one individual. She cautions against exploring pregnant embodiment
only as sex-specific as she believes that this discussion returns
to questions of sexual difference. Her point is that although sexual
difference is important, it should not distract from other ways of
understanding pregnant embodiment. Pregnant embodiment is felt not
only by the pregnant individual but also shared by others who feel it
as part of another person’s body or through an emotional connection.
This problematises individual gendered subjectivity and demands a
rethinking in the light of scholarly discussion on feminist materialisms
(Barad, 2012, 2007; Braidotti, 1994; Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012;
van der Tuin, 2011) which encourages diffracted critical thinking that
engages with the multiplicity and differences of bodies.
Tyler argues that being pregnant is not a metaphor, it is a lived-body
experience that has a transitional and transient subjectivity. She
argues that we must “reclaim pregnancy as a transient subjectivity by
reframing pregnant women as the active subjects of their own gestation”
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(2000, p. 292). She proffers that, when pregnant, she is (quoting from
Irigaray, 1985, p. 26) “neither one nor two [who] resists all adequate
definition”, adding that she is, “philosophically, a freak” (2000, p. 290).
This, Tyler suggests, is difficult to reconcile with philosophical notions
of the self as individual. Importantly, Tyler argues that thinking about
pregnant embodiment philosophically must include the implications
for non-pregnant bodies. I agree that returning to questions of sexual
difference encourages an analysis that presumes gendered embodiment
and does not tackle the nuances of gendered potentiality where women
(and female characters) are understood in relation to maternity because
they possess a female reproductive body. Inasmuch as male/female
gender definition cannot be presumed or assumed, I believe the film
offers another way of thinking through gendered embodiment. It is too
simplistic to understand Louise’s character development as maternal
without considering how the narrative structure and corporeality of the
film upends the way we understand her embodied subjectivity in relation
to reproduction.
Lisa Baraitser (2014) says that understanding reproduction and
non-reproduction as temporal can help to understand the dynamic of
“stilled” or “stalled time” as “time that refuses to flow” (p. 1). She argues
that temporality is always thought of in terms of a linear progression
to the future which is defined not only by dominant cultural narratives
linked to social and economic specificity, but also by markers of time
that bring people together such as birth and death. Baraitser (referring
to Edelman’s [2004] notion of “no future”), suggests that we must
rethink many timelines including reproduction and birth, hinting to
the possibility of a significant move away from “the fantasy of
an unfolding future held in place by heteronormative familial trajectories
[…] as a dominant cultural narrative” (2014, p. 2). The “infinitely
expanding present” (2014, p. 3), Baraitser suggests, is not time that
is incapable of change or movement because it appears to have
stopped – waiting for birth or living with the memory of a deceased
loved one – but is an expression of the dynamic flow of time. This means
that there is always a deferred affectivity, a “not yet” that signals a
rethinking, Baraitser suggests, of the subjective timelessness in relation to
death and reproduction.
In the film, reproduction is established quickly as Louise is seen in a
bed with a new-born baby and this contrasts with the gradual changes in
embodiment that she experiences throughout the film as she is exposed
to extreme environmental changes in the alien ship and to visions of her
future life, and of the aliens. The physical effects on Louise punctuate
the narrative so that when the narrative returns to what we understand as
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the present, this birth scene must be re-evaluated. Young argues that
“pregnant existence entails, finally, a unique temporality of process and
growth in which the woman can experience herself as split between
the past and the future” (2005, p. 47). This splitting and doubling relates
to the embodied state of pregnancy as it is experienced by the pregnant
person, but in the film, as I have said, it is pregnant embodiment that
is split and decentred. The spectator must believe that pregnancy
has happened to the body even if, narratively, pregnancy has “not-yet”
happened and the foetus does not exist.
Pregnant embodiment in the film is assigned to Louise by her
maternal representation but there is no evidence that Louise wants
a child or thinks about having a child. Although the lived-body
experiences of “circumstantial childlessness” (Cannold, 2000; Tonkin,
2017) may involve the presence of an imagined unborn child, that is
not what is happening in this film. Seeing herself with Hannah does not
make any sense to Louise. Importantly, it is over half-way through the film
that Louise, after seeing herself with a baby, then a child and an
adolescent, says to the aliens, “I don’t understand, who is this child?” This
moment in the narrative confounds any notion the viewer might have had
that Louise was ever pregnant and they are left to ponder the fact that
Louise is “not-yet” a parent to and has “not-yet” been pregnant with,
Hannah. Her subjectivity, then, must be questioned and her represen-
tation demands another frame of reference. Kate Ince (2017), writing
about contemporary women filmmakers, explains that Laura Mulvey
(1975) and Teresa de Lauretis (1984) argued for alternative frames
of reference beyond the positioning of the male subject to the female
object and Ince suggests that more scholarship is needed to address
questions of embodied female subjectivity that is grounded, as hers is,
in a “feminist ethic of embodiment” (p. 22). Lucy Bolton (2015) talks
about “female consciousness” as a way to circumnavigate subjectivity. In
her discussion on women filmmakers, Bolton explains that the films
that she refers to do “something different with female subjectivity [to offer
an] alternative way of being for women in the cinema” (p. 3). She suggests
that they engage with female interiority rather than female physicality to
allow the spectator to engage more directly with the female character.
Whilst Arrival does deal with Louise’s consciousness and interiority,
she has neither control of her visions nor her embodied response so that
her subjective experience is one of confusion rather than maternity.
Insofar as the film lands on questions of subjectivity and embodiment,
it can only be read as such after repeated viewings. As Laura Mulvey
(2006) suggests, it is only by stopping and starting a film repeatedly that
the detail within the film’s corporeality can be seen. It is almost
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impossible to register the detail of each shot and to discuss what the
film does when it shows Hannah unless there is a constant freezing of the
frame. Reading this film, therefore, unearths the tensions between the text
that is seen on first viewof the film and themeaning that can be read into it
through repeated viewings. By slowing down any film and investigating
its corporeality, Mulvey suggests, one can find “something extra and
unexpected, a deferred meaning, to the story’s narration” (2006, p. 151).
Analysing what Arrival does with time is only possible when the narrative
of the film is slowed so that, as Mulvey explains, “time itself becomes
palpable” (p. 150) and depends on the pensively engaged spectator who
will accept, as Mulvey says, that “narrative has its own temporality” (183).
Although narrative detail in the film remains in the diegetic present, the
reveal at the end of the film, that the intense embodied experiences of
Louise and Hannah only exist in the future, may change how the viewer
understands the affective quality of their own spectatorial encounter. As
Steven Shaviro (1993) suggests, an embodied spectatorship depends on
“sympathetic participation” or “complicitous communication” where the
spectator is “touched” (p. 53) by what is happening to the protagonist
rather than identifying with them. Vivian Sobchack (2004) suggests
embodied spectatorship can be thought of as “interobjectivity”, where the
lived-body is “at once, both an objective subject and a subjective object […]
that literally and figurally makes sense of, and to, both ourselves and
others” (p. 2, emphasis in original). Although there is no way to second
guess how the filmmakes each spectator feel, theway that the film engages
the viewer through its narrative structure places ethical thinking about
reproduction at the heart of the viewer’s experience.
Do you want to make a baby?
As I have already said, pregnant embodiment is not only something
that the pregnant person experiences subjectively, it is a state which
encourages multiple subjectivities. This is the beginning of Ian’s (Jeremy
Renner) reproductive story and when Ian finds out that Louise has always
known that their daughter would die, he leaves her. When Judith Butler
(2004) asks the question “what makes for a grievable life?” she does so in
relation to global violence and her enquiry is philosophical and political,
but her provocation “who counts as human?” and “whose lives count as
lives?” and what is an “ungrievable life” (p. 20) is central to the narrative
of this film. As Butler explains,
we have ongoing debates about whether the fetus should count as life, or a
life, or a human life; we have further debates about conception and what
constitutes the first moments of a living organism; we have debates about
Temporality in Denis Villeneuve’s Arrival
329
what constitutes death [that involve] contested notions of personhood and,
implicitly, questions regarding the “human animal” and how that
conjunctive (and chiasmic) existence is to be understood. (2016, p. 7)
She suggests that any discussion based on personhood as a marker of
life, whether limited to the foetus or not, is not sustainable as it is based
on the creation of an individual. She argues that this restricts the
debate “not only to a moral domain, but to an ontology of individualism”
(p. 19) which is at odds with the necessary interdependent social and
environmental conditions needed for life. Kate Greasley (2017) adds
that, “given the deep-rooted nature of disagreement about our own
metaphysics, it is hardly surprising that disagreement about [foetal]
personhood at the beginning of life is so intractable” (p. 106). This
discussion and Butler’s argument is much broader and more complex
than this, and I am not suggesting that the film has a political message,
but it does speak to the ethical (rather than moral) dimension to birth
and death as it is encapsulated in the film. Although Louise is in a
constant state of “not-yet” being pregnant, “not-yet” having a child, she
grieves in the present for the unfolding future in which she loses both her
child and her relationship. There is no evidence in the film that Louise
takes any moral stand on consent for conception. It appears, however, that
she does not tell Ian what will happen to their daughter. In his agreement
to – in fact his desire to – make a baby, he is, nevertheless, complicit in
whatever occurs in their future, even if he is not aware of his future
daughter’s early death.
Because of the way the film is structured, the narrative appears
unreliable in that it describes a grief that will only occur in the future. The
cyclical narrative provokes the viewer to consider their own attitude to
death before life by ending the film at the beginning of the story. In a film
about time, the symmetry of the opening and closing scenes is important
to the corporeality of the film. The intention is to blur time so that each
character is implicated in their interlocking future. It appears that Louise
enters into an agreement with Ian, in present time, to have a child that she
knows will contract an illness fromwhich it will die. This suggests that Ian
cannot see into the future in the way Louise can. Viewed differently, the
final sequence presents a more complex analysis. Ian and Louise have
both been exposed to the aliens so it is not outside the reasoning of the
film to suppose he might develop an image of the future as well. It is not
clear what, if any, notion of the future has been presented to Ian. The
events come in quick succession and the viewer is led to think that
Louise narrates the film in chronological order. Her voice-over, however,
appears to take place after the aliens have left and Ian has accompanied
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Louise to her house and is divided between the opening four minutes
of the film and the closing five minutes. The dialogue and the visuals
that we are encouraged to think of as in the present (i.e., not in Louise
and Ian’s future) take up approximately three minutes of filmic time.
This is a crucial point to note as it is in this short space of time that
the film appears to ask, but does not answer, the question of consent to
conception.
Consent is not what the film is about, but it is this question that
remains at the end of the film. The viewer is not an uninformed bystander,
and this final sequence is an implicit provocation. The “not-yet” is not
only a description of the elasticity of time or of the unfolding of affect,
it also describes the un-born-ness of the foetus and the threshold of
meaningful life. In the final sequence the pleasure on Ian’s face when
he holds Hannah (Figure 2) echoes that of Louise from the beginning
of the film (Figure 3). The matching shots lead us to believe that
neither character knows the fate of their daughter. Both images are part
of the future that has been unfolding with ever more clarity for Louise.
Figure 2. Ian looks Hannah in the eye and smiles.
Figure 3. Louise smiles and cradles Hannah as she sleeps.
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If Louise is seeing her future, the implication is that the decision about
conception has already been made with the consent of both characters,
but the time-frame of the moment of conception remains blurred enough
to allow the viewer to question Louise’s motives.
When Louise says, “so, Hannah, this is where your story begins. The
day they departed”, there are only three minutes of the film left but the
narrative in this final sequence is full of ambiguity. The visual of Louise’s
home with a slow tilt from the ceiling to the floor-to-ceiling glass window,
that frames the lake outside, matches the opening shot of the film. It is not
clear at first if we are just seeing the same shot in the same location at the
same time until we see a silhouetted figure outside the window. It is only
when Louise knocks on the window and beckons the person inside that
the parallel, repeated narrative of Louise and Hannah continues, and now
includes Ian. In the parallel narrative, Ian is introduced by his voice, “you
ready, babe?”, then his hand touches Louise’s shoulder, gold band
showing, and he enters the frame in a two-shot with Louise in what we
now understand is the future. This two-shot appears with less than two
minutes of filmic time left. The camera cuts to close-up of Hannah who
says, “Daddy”. There is now no doubt that Ian is presented as the father
and he appears in three sequences: in a close-up beside Hannah in their
future; in a close-up beside Louise, as the aliens are leaving, in their past;
and in the present in a long shot, outside the house, as a silhouette,
beckoned by Louise, that then cuts to a close-up tracking shot of Louise in
her home as they dance. The moment that joins these narratives together
is the imperceptible cut from Ian and Louise embracing as the aliens
leave, to their matching embrace in a slow dance in her home. The
different timelines are now running in parallel, but it is not completely
clear how much of what the viewer sees is from Louise’s point of view.
This is where the viewer is encouraged to consider the dramatic irony of
their own point of view, which appears to be aligned with that of Louise.
With so much narrative information appearing in the final few minutes of
the film, the viewer is encouraged to consider whether Louise is choosing
her and Ian’s future or whether their embodied futures are already written
in time. The film does not make this clear.
Ian is an essential part of pregnant embodiment as he is set up as the
biological father of the child and his character is subtly used throughout
the cyclical narrative as a voice or the person who appears before or after
Louise “sees” Hannah. Ian interrupts Louise with the sound of his voice
or by touching her lightly, putting his hand on her shoulder, or holding
her. His body is, therefore, used as a narrative bridge. This foreshadows
the relationship between the two characters and the intensity of their
physical relationship that will result in a child. There is no indication in
Film-Philosophy 22 (2018)
332
the narrative, however, that he imagines a future pregnancy or a future
child until he suggests to Louise “do you want to make a baby?” It is
important to note that there is about fifteen minutes of filmic time
between Louise asking the aliens “who is this child?”, to Ian’s suggestion
that they make a baby, which is in the final two minutes of the film.
Pregnant embodiment is implicit here. Yet, there is an equivalence that is
not the subjective experience of pregnant embodiment. The juxtaposi-
tioning of the matching visuals of Louise and Ian embracing bridges the
moments of consent and conception. In other words, conception, the
beginning of pregnant embodiment, exists in the final sequence but as
something that has “not-yet” happened. It is not clear if we are moving
back in time to the future as their dance appears to be part of the present
in the narrative, which is in Louise’s house after the aliens have gone. A
glimpse of a ring on Louise’s left hand as she dances with Ian suggests
that these two scenes are not sequential and there is a greater temporal
ellipse between themmeaning that the end shot of the film, as Louise and
Ian embrace as the aliens leave, is their present. This ellipsis underlines
how the film continues to rework temporality to create uncertainty in the
narrative.
The prolepsis, which bookends the main narrative and wrongfoots
the viewer, baffles Louise who cannot understand the vision-like
sequences of a child that invade her consciousness. When Louise is
first seen as post-partum ( just given birth), she is in a room where she is
holding, stroking, and smiling at a baby. The close framing allows the
viewer to see what is happening but keeps them at a distance by limiting
the view of the room. There is no establishing shot, but there are
suggestions of a relationship as we see another unidentified person in
silhouette. There is evidence of a marriage with rapid close-ups of a gold
ring on Louise’s ring finger and on the silhouetted figure. This scene
establishes quickly and aesthetically a traditional, biological mother. It is
not clear whether the unidentified person is the father, a friend, or medic.
From here, a montage shows a progression from the baby to a young girl
to a dying adolescent. This sequence is from Louise’s future as, in the plot
of the film, she is “not-yet” pregnant, she is “not-yet” with the biological
father, her daughter is “not-yet” conceived so can not-yet die. But, this
opening sequence influences the way we understand Louise throughout
the narrative in the present of filmic time. The viewer is encouraged to
“see” Louise’s character as a mother, as a grieving mother, and therefore
“see” her character not as she is but as something she has only the
potential to become at the end of the film. This appears at first screening,
I suggest, to be a clunky and slightly over-laboured backstory to the
main character Louise. We are, however, being set up as viewers to
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assume pregnant embodiment. This is done by conceptualising Hannah
as a “child”.
Hannah is from Louise and Ian’s future. She is “not-yet” alive. It is
important, however, for the viewer to believe that she is alive and has died
and one of the ways the film does this is to orientate the viewer around the
figure of Hannah as child. Not only is Louise becoming a “mother” in
the eyes of the viewer, Hannah is also becoming a “child”. The more we
see of Hannah, the more we recognise her as “child”. But, she does not
exist. Louise and Hannah are both in the process of becoming parent and
child. In child development, Emma Uprichard (2008) says that the
process of “being” a child always involves “becoming the adult” where the
“will-be” is more important than the “is” (p. 304). Hannah is growing
up and becoming an adult but the becoming ends in adolescence so she
is in a constant state of “not-yet” being born, not-yet “being” a child, but,
nevertheless, dying. The importance of orientating the viewer in relation
to Hannah is clearly shown in the sequence where Hannah and Louise
play outdoors. Hannah is seen from Louise’s point of view and Louise
from Hannah’s point of view. There is a subtle change in these points of
view as the camera follows Hannah, who is, at first, in the centre of the
frame in an out-of-focus long shot. As the camera moves closer and the
framing tightens, Hannah remains at the centre of the frame and becomes
more distinguishable. The camera pivots to the left (Figure 4) to follow
Hannah running as Louise (now out of focus) moves out of the frame.
Then the camera follows Hannah to the right (Figure 5) as she moves
away from Louise. Finally, Louise remains in the centre frame in a
mid-close-up, but as part of a long shot whose subject is Hannah. The
viewer must look beyond Louise to Hannah, who is in the distance but
prioritised in the frame. Louise’s head then bows into the frame to cover
Hannah from view. This encourages the viewer to invest in each
Figure 4. The camera pivots to the left, following Hannah.
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character’s point of view by sharing the intimacy of this moment.
This shared intimacy is strongly reinforced later in the narrative when
Hannah is shown as a young girl, lying down, facing the camera, in
soft-light, saying “I love you” and followed by a head-shot of an adolescent
Hannah in harsh hospital lights screaming “I hate you”. Hannah’s
dialogue is directed at Louise, but her eye-line, looking out of the frame
towards the audience, is designed to provoke a reaction from the viewer. It
is as if she is shouting at us. Our subjectivity is important, our multiple
subjectivities. It is crucial that we have a vested interest in Hannah as
someone who exists.
One of the moments that Louise “feels” then sees Hannah is when
she begins to decipher the aliens writing (or figures of expression) almost
half-way through the film. Bent over the large format figures, she lays
the document in front of her, takes a ruler, and scores the figures. It is
at this moment that she “hears” something then “sees” or “feels” the
presence of the young child. Because of the opening sequence, the
audience is encouraged to believe that this is a flashback, an analepsis,
where Louise watches her child, the child who dies in the opening
sequence. Importantly, we can understand that she “feels” something. Her
body stops and she bends over as if in pain or dizziness. This, I suggest,
is a moment of embodied change. Whilst not necessarily a moment of
pregnant embodiment, the juxtapositioning with images of Hannah
suggests it includes pregnant embodiment. The temporal ellipsis means
that pregnancy and pregnant embodiment is assumed between the
moment of Louise’s embodied “feeling” and the sequence of their
conversation. Importantly, the spectator now has an extended view of
Hannah. The mid-close-up on Hannah (Figure 6) shows the texture of her
hair, woven into plaits, the texture of her dress, the pencil cases and bag
on the table, and the out-of-focus landscape in the background. The child
is being conceptualised through the aesthetic of the film. Matching
Figure 5. The camera pivots to the right, following Hannah.
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eye-lines and point-of-view shots establish the close relationship between
Louise and Hannah. Importantly, the detailed side-shots of Hannah
demonstrate that she is being conceptualised for the viewer.
Hannah is given a physicality, an aliveness, as she is seen running,
painting, drawing, and shouting, which presupposes an active body,
one that is engaged with the environment and with the people around
her. This is coupled with the physicality Hannah experiences when she is
with Ian and Louise. Hannah’s body is held, her hair is stroked, she is
picked up, her hand is held, and she responds to having her hair stroked
by closing her eyes (Figure 7). She has a physical presence within the
diegesis of the film that is emphasised by the corporeality of the film
as she takes up more filmic time. Earlier in the film, Hannah is seen as
if in a flowing or ebbing consciousness that might be memory and this
is shown in soft-focus shots, at canted angles in the frame, and as an
unrecognisable silhouette. This gives the appearance that Hannah is
appearing through the movement of time, in the way memories resurface
repetitively. Importantly, it is Louise’s body that anchors the narrative so
that although time is re-ordered, it appears linear. It is this grounding of
Figure 6. Hannah is seen in close-up as she listens to Louise talking.
Figure 7. Hannah responds physically to Louise’s touch by closing her eyes.
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Louise’s character and physicality that allows Hannah’s character to be
read as a memory.
Although Louise’s embodiment is crucial to the narrative, I suggest
some caution with the temptation to apportion her embodied changes
to pregnant embodiment. Louise experiences intense changes to her
embodiment as an integral part of the film. She is doubled up, bending
forward, before she “sees” Hannah and this could be read as mimicking
a contraction or foreshadowing the deliberate movements of the heavily
pregnant person. Again, when she revisits the alien spacecraft alone, she
appears as if she is underwater with her eyes barely open and her
hair flailing slowly around her head. In another context, her embodied
experience at this point could be described as embryonic. It must
be remembered, however, that embodied experiences are part of the
aesthetic of the film. Before she ever “sees” Hannah, Louise’s hands
shake, it is through her hands and fingertips that she absorbs the
language of the aliens, she feels faint while breathing through an oxygen
mask in her spacesuit, she floats upwards and is thrown sideways
by altered gravity and the atmosphere of the space ship. Ian also
experiences strong embodied reaction. He stumbles when he first leaves
the astronauts’ cage, falling upwards in the altered gravity. He then
vomits into a bin when he enters the changing room on his return to the
solid terrestrial surface of the ground. It could be argued that Ian is
similarly experiencing something of pregnant embodiment. As the two
characters are so intimately linked through the corporeality of the
film, and through their future reproductive bodies, perhaps they are
both capable of experiencing pregnancy. As pregnancy is absent as
embodiment in the present for both characters, we cannot dismiss this
equivalence and potential un-gendering of pregnant embodiment.
The film implies, through its narrative construction and aesthetics, that
pregnancy and pregnant embodiment “exist” in the narrative whether
they are experienced as something that happens to the body or not.
This raises important questions about how pregnant embodiment can be
understood as a subjective experience. When is pregnant embodiment
felt? Is it an individual state that no-one else can share? Or is it that we
experience life as a collection of embodied experiences? Embodiment
is a subjective experience and is inherent in our understanding of
spectatorship. The images in the film are not presented as complex
mental landscapes, but the film encourages a conceptual understanding
of time and reproduction. The viewer knows that the child has died from
the beginning, but it is not until the final ten minutes, in the narrative
turning point that resolves the film, that they realise that the child
has “not yet” been born. At the end of filmic time, the foetus is not alive,
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it is “not-yet” conceived, “not-yet” developed, and “not-yet-born”. Louise is
also “not-yet” pregnant, “not-yet” a parent, and has “not-yet” lost a child.
Louise, however, must be understood as a person who is not pregnant at
the end of the film. The subjective experience of pregnant embodiment is
not only in the subjective “now-ness” of pregnancy and maternity, it also
exists in the “not-yet” or “not-ever”. Thinking of pregnant embodiment as
temporal in the narrative means including, as Tyler suggests we should,
the non-pregnant. One of the questions that the film provokes is, should
Louise knowingly give birth to someone who will die? Given the fact that
this is inherent in all human reproduction, I suggest that the ending of
the film, where the moment of consent is undetermined, presents us
with ethical rather than moral questions about the worth of life and
consent for conception. My reading of the film encourages us to think
differently about pregnancy and pregnant embodiment so that we are
not so distracted by notions of maternity and motherhood that we fail to
“see” pregnancy and only “see” it on-screen when it is visible to us as a
body or is explicit in an embodied state within the narrative and then only
as it relates to the characterisation of the woman. I am not suggesting
that the film knowingly presents the ethics of reproduction as its main
aim, but I do argue for its central importance. Moreover, as there is
very little film scholarship that engages with contemporary issues of
reproduction that are distinct from female subjectivity or representation,
this article highlights the pressing need for a more complex discussion on
the ethics of pregnancy, reproduction, and reproductive rights.
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